In practice, this means that members of the military who are subject to the law may not participate in civilian law enforcement unless doing so is expressly authorized by a statute or the Constitution.
No, only federal military personnel are covered. While the Posse Comitatus Act refers only to the Army and Air Force, a different statute extends the same rule to the Navy and Marine Corps. The Coast Guard, though part of the federal armed forces, has express statutory authority to perform law enforcement and is not bound by the Posse Comitatus Act.
campaign english for law enforcement pdf 32
Police reforms, often imposed after incidents of racist misconduct or brutality, have focused on addressing these unconscious manifestations of bias. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), for example, has required implicit bias training as part of consent decrees it imposes to root out discriminatory practices in law enforcement agencies. Such training measures are designed to help law enforcement officers recognize these unconscious biases in order to reduce their influence on police behavior.
These reforms, while well-intentioned, leave unaddressed an especially harmful form of bias, which remains entrenched within law enforcement: explicit racism. Explicit racism in law enforcement takes many forms, from membership or affiliation with violent white supremacist or far-right militant groups, to engaging in racially discriminatory behavior toward the public or law enforcement colleagues, to making racist remarks and sharing them on social media. While it is widely acknowledged that racist officers subsist within police departments around the country, federal, state, and local governments are doing far too little to proactively identify them, report their behavior to prosecutors who might unwittingly rely on their testimony in criminal cases, or protect the diverse communities they are sworn to serve.
Efforts to address systemic and implicit biases in law enforcement are unlikely to be effective in reducing the racial disparities in the criminal justice system as long as explicit racism in law enforcement continues to endure. There is ample evidence to demonstrate that it does.
Any law enforcement officers associating with these groups should be treated as a matter of urgent concern. Operating under color of law, such officers put the lives and liberty of people of color, religious minorities, LGBTQ+ people, and anti-racist activists at extreme risk, both through the violence they can mete out directly and by their failure to properly respond when these communities are victimized by other racist violent crime. Biased policing also tears at the fabric of American society by undermining public trust in equal justice and the rule of law.
The most effective way for law enforcement agencies to restore public trust and prevent racism from influencing law enforcement actions is to prohibit individuals who are members of white supremacist groups or who have a history of explicitly racist conduct from becoming law enforcement officers in the first place, or from remaining officers once bias is demonstrated. All law enforcement agencies should do the following:
The Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019, a Senate bill introduced by Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL), includes a provision that requires the FBI to assess the threat posed by white supremacist and neo-Nazi infiltration of law enforcement and the military. This assessment should be informed by data collected from FBI investigations and surveys of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and from data collected for the law enforcement use of force database.
Lastly, Congress should pass the End Racial and Religious Profiling Act of 2019 to ban all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies from profiling based on actual or perceived race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation. Banning racial profiling would mark a significant step toward mitigating the potential harm caused by racist officers undetected within the ranks.
I am here to indicate the support of the Duterte government for the anti-drug campaign. The office of the Solicitor General is the defender of the Republic of the Philippines and the people of the Philippines. The people of the Philippines have had enough of this drug menace that is corrupting and destroying our youth and society.
The US government, the former colonial power and historically one of the closest allies of the Philippines, was slow to criticize the anti-drug campaign. Once it did so, however, it has become a persistent critic and taken direct steps to reduce US support for the Philippine National Police, though not to other security forces. Initial reports indicate, however, that this could change dramatically under President Donald Trump.
US suspension of security assistance to the Philippine police has not affected its assistance to the armed forces. In November, the State Department announced that the $5 million of assistance earmarked for law enforcement assistance in the $180 million 2017 fiscal assistance program would be shifted, with $4.5 million going to maritime law enforcement, and the remaining money to human rights training and internal reform efforts. According to then-State Department spokesperson John Kirby:
The attacker appears to have compromised the email server of a hospital and the corporate website of a consulting company in order to use their infrastructure to send phishing emails. The phishing emails were made to look like secure communication from a Public Affairs official at the U.S. Department of State, hosted on a page made to look like another Department of State Public Affairs official's personal drive, and used a legitimate Department of State form as a decoy. This information could be obtained via publicly available data, and there is no indication that the Department of State network was involved in this campaign. The attacker used unique links in each phishing email and the links that FireEye observed were used to download a ZIP archive that contained a weaponized Windows shortcut file, launching both a benign decoy document and a Cobalt Strike Beacon backdoor, customized by the attacker to blend in with legitimate network traffic.
There are several similarities and technical overlaps between the 14 November 2018, phishing campaign and the suspected APT29 phishing campaign on 9 November 2016, both of which occurred shortly after U.S. elections. However, the new campaign included creative new elements as well as a seemingly deliberate reuse of old phishing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), including using the same system to weaponize a Windows shortcut (LNK) file. APT29 is a sophisticated actor, and while sophisticated actors are not infallible, seemingly blatant mistakes are cause for pause when considering historical uses of deception by Russian intelligence services. It has also been over a year since we have conclusively identified APT29 activity, which raises questions about the timing and the similarities of the activity after such a long interlude.
Notable similarities between this and the 2016 campaign include the Windows shortcut metadata, targeted organizations and specific individuals, phishing email construction, and the use of compromised infrastructure. Notable differences include the use of Cobalt Strike, rather than custom malware; however, many espionage actors do use publicly and commercially available frameworks for reasons such as plausible deniability.
During the phishing campaign, there were indications that the site hosting the malware was selectively serving payloads. For example, requests using incorrect HTTP headers reportedly served ZIP archives containing only the benign publicly available Department of State form. It is possible that the threat actor served additional and different payloads depending on the link visited; however, FireEye has only observed two: the benign and Cobalt Strike variations.
This activity has TTP and targeting overlap with previous activity, suspected to be APT29. The malicious LNK used in the recent spearphishing campaign, ds7002.lnk (MD5: 6ed0020b0851fb71d5b0076f4ee95f3c), has technical overlaps with a suspected APT29 LNK from November 2016, 37486-the-shocking-truth-about-election-rigging-in-america.rtf.lnk (MD5: f713d5df826c6051e65f995e57d6817d), which was publicly reported by Volexity. The 2018 and 2016 LNK files are similar in structure and code, and contain significant metadata overlap, including the MAC address of the system on which the LNK was created.
Additional overlap was observed in the targeting and tactics employed in the phishing campaigns responsible for distributing these LNK file. Previous APT29 activity targeted some of the same recipients of this email campaign, and APT29 has leveraged large waves of emails in previous campaigns.
12. In addition to its military activities, Russia has also intensified its hybrid actions against NATO Allies and partners, including through proxies. This includes attempted interference in Allied elections and democratic processes; political and economic pressure and intimidation; widespread disinformation campaigns; malicious cyber activities; and turning a blind eye to cyber criminals operating from its territory, including those who target and disrupt critical infrastructure in NATO countries. It also includes illegal and destructive activities by Russian Intelligence Services on Allied territory, some of which have claimed lives of citizens and caused widespread material damage. We stand in full solidarity with the Czech Republic and other Allies that have been affected in this way.
31. Our nations continue to face threats and challenges from both state and non-state actors who use hybrid activities to target our political institutions, our public opinion, and the security of our citizens. While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests with the targeted nation, NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign being conducted against it, including by deploying a Counter Hybrid Support Team. In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack. NATO and Allies will continue to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid threats. Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative. We are enhancing our situational awareness and expanding the tools at our disposal to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing comprehensive preventive and response options. We will also continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges. 2ff7e9595c
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